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I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly aggressive competition in the business community
and turbulence in the economy' have combined to unleash a fierce
form of corporate Darwinism known as the takeover. 2 Fifteen
years have passed since Congress promulgated the Williams Act,3
1. The rising popularity of the takeover attempt appears to be a product of several economic elements: the growth period of the 1960's increased corporate
liquidity and readily available credit, while the recent inflationary times have
increased incentives for attempting takeovers because of undervalued stock
and augmented corporate desires for stable investments. See generally E.
ARANow & H. EinHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 65-66 (1973);
Boehm, State Interests and Interstate Commerce: A Look at the Theoretical
Underpinningsof Takeover Legislation, 36 WASH. & LEE I REV. 733 (1979).
2. A successful "takeover" results in a sale of the majority portion of outstanding shares in a public corporation to the takeover bidder. See generally E.
ARANow & L EINHoRN, supra note 1.
3. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§78m-78n (1964)) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §78m
(d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f) (1976)).
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which regulates the transactions involved in corporate takeover attempts; Nebraska followed suit by passing a stricter regulatory
scheme in the Corporate Takeover Act of 1977.4 With state takeover laws across the country coming under increasing judicial fire,
Nebraska took emergency action in May of 1983 to change its statute, in hopes of bringing it under the umbrella of constitutional
acceptability. In Missouri Public Service Co. v. Amen,5 however,6
the Federal District Court of Nebraska enjoined state officials
from enforcing the new takeover act on the grounds that the state
regulations were violative of the supremacy and commerce clauses
7
of the Constitution.
Missouri Public Service arrives at a critical juncture in the continuing national controversy surrounding state takeover legislation. 8 The case comes at a point in which a legion of courts 9 and
commentators' 0 alike have overwhelmingly rejected these state
schemes as being unconstitutional, based on the dual challenge
echoed in Missouri Public Service. This stiff rebuff directed at
state takeover legislation culminated when the United States
Supreme Court invalidated an Illinois takeover act in Edgar v.
MITE Corp.11
Standing at a great crossroads, the decision in Missouri Public
Service transcends a singular review of one takeover statute and
plunges Nebraska into a referendum on the efficacy of state regulation in its entirety. The underlying issues of this case take on added significance because the Federal District Court of Nebraska
rejected the unique new statute,12 even after the legislature had
excised many of the constitutionally objectionable provisions. Although the future of state regulation hangs in precarious balance,
these negative voices need not sound the death knell for such legislation. Recent trends in judicial and legislative actions have
opened up avenues for state regulatory efforts; available options
4. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (Supp. 1980) (repealed 1983).

5. No. CV 83-L-362 (D. Neb. June 22, 1983) (order granting preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order).
6. The state officials involved in this court order were Paul Amen, former Director of the Department of Banking and Finance, and Paul Douglas, Attorney
General of Nebraska.
7. Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Amen, No. CV 83-L-362, at 3 (D. Neb. June 22, 1983).
8. At this point, 37 states have enacted takeover regulations. See Tiger, The
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law: A Statute Waiting to Be Invalidated, 25 VILL. L. REV. 458, 458 n.10 (1980).

9. See infra note 47.
10. See, e.g., Tiger, supra note 8, at 458. Wilner &Landy, The Tender Trap: State
Takeover Statutes and Their Constitutionality,45 FoRDHAM L REV. 1 (1976).
11. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
12. Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2418 to -2430 (Cum.
Supp. 1983).
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are now particularly important for the many jurisdictions (including Nebraska) which have, in recent court struggles, rendered
their takeover statutes impotent. This Article suggests that a judicial reorientation may attain a point of equilibrium at which a
state, seeking to further shelter corporations from the trauma of
takeover, may enact constitutionally sound legislation.

II. BACKGROUND: ESTABLISHING THE NEED
FOR CHANGE
A.

The Williams Act

In Missouri Public Service Co. v. Amen, Judge Warren K.
Urbom found that the Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act was probably preempted by the federally enacted Williams Act.13 It is thus
instructive to inquire into the origins and substantive highlights of
this federal legislation.
Before Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968, cash tender
offers14 enjoyed an unfettered existence at all regulatory levels of
the government.15 The Williams Act represented the legislative re13. No. CV 83-L-362, at 3 (D. Neb. June 22, 1983). The district court stated that the
"[p]laintiff has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on its claim
that the Corporate Takeover Act is null and void on its face [because it is]
...
preempted by the Williams Act provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934." The standards governing injunctive relief require a mere
probability of success on the merits of the case. Other factors such as
whether harm will be laid upon other parties if the relief is granted, and the
effect of public interest, are also weighed in the balance. See Baker v. Premis,
No. CV 82-L-459, slip op. (D. Neb. Aug. 30, 1982).
14. Tender offers are defined as public solicitations of the shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares in exchange for a specified cash amount above
the current market price. See generally, Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp.
783, 823-24 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) (defining the elements of a tender offer); E. ARANOW, H. EmHoRN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1-34 (1977); J. FLOM, M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS-TENDER OFFERS AND GOING PRIVATE (1976);

Kramer, Budwick & Hope, Tender Offers: Background and Definition, in
TENDER OFFERS: MAKING AND MEETING THEM (C. Kanter ed. 1979); Note, The

Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 86 HARV. I REV. 1250, 1251-52 (1973); Note, The Elusive Definition of a
Tender Offer, 7 J. CORP. I 503 (1982).
15. Prior to the Williams Act, the law required only insiders to make disclosures
in trading securites. Although proxy contests were also regulated under the
Securities Exchange Acts, the federal government failed to specifically treat
the issue of cash tender offers. See S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1967); Sowards &Mofsky, CorporateTake-over Bids: Gap in FederalSecurities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 499 (1967). Regulation of tender offers
did occur, but only from occasional litigation under Rule lOb-5. See Moore v.
Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967) (enjoining the takeover
bid under rationale that the offeror failed to meet disclosure requirements of
Rule lOb-5); 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3, 655 (Supp. 1969). But cf.
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sponse to the proliferating use 16 of the tender offer, a device employed with increasing sophistication17 to gain control of a
corporation resisting acquisition. The tender offer mechanism
had, in the Supreme Court's words,18 "removed a substantial
number of corporate control contests from the reach of existing
disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws."' 9
In a hostile takeover attempt, the bidding corporation makes a
tender offer directly to the shareholders of the "target" corporation, 20 in a quid pro quo for substantial control in that company.
The ranks fall into place and the battle strategies are formulated
almost without variation in the typical takeover scenario. The bidder's plan for corporate conquest entails a form of financial "blitzkrieg" 21 in which a sweeping knockout coup takes the target's
management by surprise. This initial blow comes in the form of
public offers for phenomenal premiums over the prevailing market
price,22 motivating shareholders to sell out large blocks of holdings
within a period of days. By quickly negotiating the terms of control directly vis-a-vis the shareholders, the offeror bypasses the incumbent management of the resisting corporation, and thus
circumvents protracted proxy contests, as well as the Maginot Line
23
of defensive tools at the command of the target management.

16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

23.

Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding that
neither the shareholder nor the target management had standing to sue a
tender offeror under Rule 10b-5), aJffd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), affd in part and rev'd in part after reh'g en
banc 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
See The Great Takeover Binge, Bus. WK., Nov. 14, 1977, at 176; After Wave of
Mergers,Analysts Debate Pauses, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1982, at Dl, col. 1 ('"The
latest surge in merger activity 'has only two quantitative equals in United
States industrial history."').
See Boehm, supra note 1, at 735-36.
Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
Id. at 22. The Piper Court apparently was speaking of such contests for corporate control as the proxy fight or the merger attempt. See supra note 15.
The target corporation's securities are the subject of a tender offer in a takeover attempt. For elaboration, see E. ARANow & H. EnfoRN, supra note 1, at
1-9.
These rapidly forced tender offer transactions are also called "Saturday Night
Specials." See Bartell, The Wisconsin Takeover Statute, 32 Bus. LAw. 1465,
1466 (1977); Comment, Securities Regulation: The Validity of North Carolina's Tender Offer DisclosureAct, WAKE FOREST L REV. 267, 269 n.12 (1982).
These premiums often represent as much as sixty percent of the prevailing
market price. The tender offer involved in the Missouri Public Service dispute was $14.00 per share or $3.00 per share above the then current price of
the target company. Brascan Holdings, Inc. made tender offers representing
a premium of up to 79A percent over commonly traded prices in its attempt to
take over F. W. Woolworth Co. See Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,247, at 91,624 (E.D. La. May 3, 1979).
Once in control, the bidding corporation may replace the incumbent management of the target company. For an in-depth discussion of target manage-
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The target company's defense strategy, on the other hand, is
directed toward delay,2 4 during which the target management may
resort to a vast array of defensive maneuvers. Incumbent managers have employed a grab bag of tactics, including: enticing
friendly offers from white knights;25 entering into transactions
which would render subsequent acquisition violative of antitrust
laws; 26 and offering competitive bids in their own right to defeat
27
outside domination.
28
The stakes and emotions 2 9 run high as the target management

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

ment's defensive strategies, see Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and
Obligationsof CorporateDirectorsin Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 44
(1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161 (1981).
See Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 9 (S.D Ind. 1978) ('"The single
most effective weapon a target company may utilize to defeat a tender offer is
delay."). See also Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 15230, FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,748, at 80,985 (Oct. 13, 1978).
This actually did occur in Missouri Public Service Co.'s struggle to acquire
The Gas Service Co. Gas Service invited Kansas City Power & Light as a
white knight bidder (e.g. an offeror who is supported by the target's incumbent management) to deliver a knockout offer against Missouri Public Service. For other examples, see the invitation of Stokely-Van Camp, Inc. to
Quaker Oats Co. to make a friendly offer in order to defeat Pillsbury Co.'s
hostile takeover attempt, Quaker Oats Bid for Stokely Tops Pillsbury'sOffer,
Wall St. J., July 18, 1983, at 3, col. 1; and the attempted takeover of Pullman,
Inc., where Wheelabrator-Fry, Inc., as a white knight, raised J. Ray McDermott's initial bid for Pullman from $28 per share to $51.50 per share in 1980,
Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1980, at 2, col. 2.
For example, the management of Marshall Field & Co. defeated Carter Hawley Hale's tender offer by negotiating the acquisition of a store located in a
Houston shopping mall where the offeror already had a store. This acquisition prevented the takeover by irritating potential antitrust problems inherent in the offer. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill.
1980), aO"'d, 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). See generally Millstein, Antitrust Aspects of Takeovers and Mergers: The Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 32 Bus. LAw. 1517 (1977).
See, e.g., MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980) (Chicago Rivet &
Machine Co. defeated the takeover attempt of MITE Corp. through a
purchase of shares by the target management).
The money involved in most takeover offers runs into seven and eight-digit
figures. For example, Crane Co.'s hostile offer for Harsco Corporation's stock
involved $60.8 million. Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 783 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Pillsbury Co.'s hostile tender offer for Stokely-Van Camp Inc. involved $173
million, Wall St. J., July 18, 1983, at 3, col. 1. Texaco Inc.'s friendly takeover
bid for Getty Oil recently broke all records by reaching $9.89 billion. Wall St.
J., Jan. 9, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
Merely attempting a takeover may involve phenomenal costs. For example, see Dart Industries, Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. 1, 8 (S.D. Ind. 1978) ('To
date, plaintiffs have incurred out-of-pocket expenses of over $1 million as a
result of fees owed to its investment advisors, legal fees, and advertising and
printing costs."); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,804, at 90,032 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980) ("In the instant case, plaintiff [the bid-
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fights for what it perceives to be the best interests of its security
holders (which is also directly linked to the management's own
professional future), and the offeror fights for an attractive investment. Hostile takeover battles often degenerate into a mudslinging brawl. It became evident that, without adequate control, such
a sanguinary struggle could injure the target shareholders as the
battle is dragged into the "courts, on Wall Street, and through the
media." 30 The potential for bypassing many of the investor-protecting reforms instituted in the Securities Exchange Act of 1933
and 193431 warranted attention as the takeover fever hit in the
1960's.
Prompted by the fear that seductive premiums and the pressurized environment enveloping tender offers would lure shareholders away from making informed investment decisions,
Congress promulgated statutory regulations intended to educate
the target's security holders, and give fair warning of the magnitude and context of the contemplated transaction. 32 Without filling
this regulatory "gap" 33 in securities law, proponents of the bill argued, the investor could get swallowed up in the tempest of the
tender offer and be left with inadequate information to decide
whether to tender his stock at the offered price, or assume the
risks34 attendant in retaining his stock after the takeover
metamorphosis.
The disclosure provisions of the Williams Act are embodied in
amendments to sections 13(d) and 14(d) of the 1934 Securities Ex-

29.
30.
31.
32.

der] must make significant interest payments for each day in which the offer
is extended. .. ").
For an interesting view of the fears, pressures, and sensationalism surrounding takeover attempts, see Johnson & Teresko, Frustrationand Fear: The
Human Side of Takeover Attempt, INDusTRY WK. Nov. 24, 1975, at 25.
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 547 F. Supp. 533, 534 (D. Md. 1982).
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78kk (1976).
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FuLL DIscLosURE OF EQurry
OWNERSHIP AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st

Sess. 2-4 (1967).
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
33. Id. at 4;,
CONG. & AD.NEWS 2811, 2813.

34. Some Congressmen worried about the prospect of "corporate raiders" attempting to "loot" the target companies in the tender offer process. See Full
Disclosure of CorporateEquity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids:
Hearingson S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securitiesof the Senate Comm. on
Baking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1967) (statement of Sen.
Thomas H. Kuchel); 111 CONG. REC. 28,257-58 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Harrison A. Williams). Before the Williams Act tempered the abuses of the takeover mechanism, some tender offerors liquidated the target's stock upon
acquisition, and used the proceeds for the offeror's benefit. See Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (offeror purchased a controlling
interest in the target company in order to liquidate it and take advantage of
appreciated leaf tobacco possessed by the target).
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change Act.35 These provisions require the offeror 36 to file with the

Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), inter alia:the tender offeror's identity and background; the total sum of funds behind the
takeover bid and the source of those funds; the offeror's present
holdings in the target corporation; and any plans to liquidate,
merge, or make any other fundamental alterations37 in the target's
corporate structure once the offeror takes control.
In addition to initiating these disclosure requirements, the Williams Act also provided substantive protections for shareholders in
tender offer situations. Aimed at stabilizing the volatile first days
of the tender offer process, 38 the legislation requires uniformly
priced offers, 39 sales on a pro rata basis,40 a minimum shareholder
withdrawal period, 41 and adherence to a broad anti-fraud
provision.
B. State Legislation
The restrictions contained in the Williams Act not only failed to
extinguish the takeover fever, but the phenomenon plunged forward, unchecked.43 Critics of the Act felt it was ineffectual in corralling the voracious conglomerate appetite for takeover
investments, and clamored for additional regulation that would increase the chances for a more informed investor evaluation of hostile takeover offers. A flurry of state legislation followed44 as
the reins tighter
localities awakened to the perceived need to draw
45
on the runaway takeover boom of the 1970's.
A considerable body of case law has grown out of the challenges
to state tender offer regulation. Since the birth of these statutes, at
35. Williams Act §§ 13(d), 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).
36. The offeror may be a natural person, company, government, instrumentality
of government, or partnership. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(a) (9), 78n(d) (2) (1976).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976).
38. One commentator has explained that before the advent of the Williams Act,
"stockholders were being stampeded to accept questionable or inadequate
offers because there was often insufficient time to obtain a higher offer."
Arsht, The Delaware Takeover Statute-SpecialProblemsfor Directors, 32
Bus. LAw. 1461, 1461 (1977).
39. Williams Act § 14(d) (7), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (7) (1976).
40.- Id. § 14(d)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (6) (1976).
41. Id. § 14(d) (5), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (5) (1976).
42. Id. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
43. For example, the "merger mania sweeping the oil industry a few years ago"
has culminated in Texaco Inc.'s latest offer to purchase most of Getty Oil's
79.1 million outstanding shares. Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1984, at 1, col. 6. See also
supra note 16.
44. Virginia actually enacted its tender offer statute about four months before
Congress passed the Williams Act, VA. CODE §§ 13.1-528 to -541 (1978 &Supp.
1982).
45. See supra note 8.
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least fifteen courts have determined 46 that these state regulatory
schemes are preempted by the Williams Act or excessively burden
interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause.47 Other
courts have cast serious doubts upon the constitutional acceptability of state takeover laws, although the cases did not turn on that
issue.4 8 Only a handful of statutes have survived initial challenge, 49 and even some of these laws have met their demise in sub5
sequent challenges. O
In retrospect, it appears that most of the corporate takeover
statutes did, in fact, fail the constitutional test of preemption. 51 Although this initial drive for takeover legislation on the state level
outwardly purported to adopt the federal goal of investor protection,5 2 the input of local corporate management, as a lobbying en46. Tender offer litigation arises in a number of procedural contexts, including
requests for preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders, and
disposition on the merits.
47. Telvest v. Bradshaw, 697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Va.); National City Lines,
Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Mo.); Kennecott Corp. v.
Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980) (N.J.); MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486
(7th Cir. 1980) (Ill.); Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.
1978) (venue in district court was improper) (Idaho), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Missouri Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Amen, No. CV 83-L-362 (D. Neb. June 22, 1983) (Neb.); Bendix
Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982) (Md.); Canadian Pac. Enters. (U.S.), Inc. v. Krouse, 506 F. Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(Ohio); Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Pa.); Natomas Co.
v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191 (D. Nev. 1981) (Nev.); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc. v. Marley, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,246 (W.D Okla. July 17, 1981)
(Okla.); Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, 1980 FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH)
97,804 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980) (S.C.); Dart Indus., Inc. v. Conrad, 426 F. Supp. 1
(S.D. Ind. 1978) (Ind.); Brascan Ltd. v. Lassiter, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,247 (E.D. La. May 3, 1979) (La.); Kelly v. Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich. App. 51,
302 N.W.2d 596 (1981) (Mich.); Eure v. Grand Metropolitan Ltd., FED. SEC. L
REP. (CCH) 97,694 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 18, 1980) (N.C.).
48. See, e.g., Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 1341 (E.D.
Mo. 1979); UV Indus., Inc. v. Posner, 466 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Me. 1979); S-G Sec.,
Inc. v. Fuqua Inv. Co., 466 F. Supp. 1114 (D. Mass. 1978); GM Sub Corp. v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 415 A.2d 473 (Del. 1980); UV Indus., Inc. v. Sharon Steel
Corp., BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) %71,4166 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
49. See, e.g., Strode v. Esmark, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,538 (Ky. Cir. Ct.
May 13, 1980); Wylain, Inc. v. TRE Corp., 412 A.2d 338 (Del. Ch. 1980).
50. See, e.g., Sharon Steel Corp. v. Whaland, 121 N.H. 607, 433 A.2d 1250 (1981),
vacated, 458 U.S. 1101 (June 28, 1982) (case remanded to the New Hampshire
Supreme Court "for further consideration in light of Edgarv. MITE Corp.").
51. Traditional preemption analysis has its roots in the supremacy clause, which
prohibits state laws that are inconsistent with a valid congressional enactment. See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2. See generally L TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIoNAL LAw 342-44 (1978); Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shifting
Perspectives on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 623
(1975); Note, A Frameworkfor PreemptionAnalysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363 (1978).
52. It was declared, for example, that the purpose of the Ohio takeover statute
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tity, belied such a benign complexion. 53 In their strides toward
pro-management parochialism, the states enacted provisions
which sought only to shelter local industry by inhibiting the tender
offer vehicle.54 This disrupted the dual federal goal of protecting
investors, while still preserving a carefully constructed balance in
the web of conflicting interests between the takeover bidder and
55
the incumbent management.
State legislation displayed its protectionist bias in provisions
delaying the tender offer process. This feature of delay became
manifest in several mechanisms, the most blatant of which was the
precommencement waiting period.56 Provisions for administrative
hearings, 57 enabling the state government to suspend tender offers
for an open-ended duration, also came under fire.5 8 More subtle
methods of inhibiting the hostile tender offer, such as exempting
from regulation tender offers that won the approval of the target
corporation's management,5 9 were woven into the state regulatory
fabric.
Many courts also found that the extraterritorial reach of takeover statutes ran afoul of commerce clause restrictions on state
legislation. 60 Jurisdiction was typically based on some tenuous
minimum contact with the regulating state, e.g., the location of
substantial assets or principal place of business 6 1 within state borders, or a charter of incorporation in the state.6 2 Quite frequently
the long reach of these regulations extended to sister states, or
even foreign nations. Given the fact that many target companies
are publicly held, this almost ensured a geographic scattering of
the target's shareholders and, thus, preserved the extraterritorial
was to "protect shareholders of Ohio and Ohio-based corporations by requiring... fair, full, and effective disclosure to shareholders in regard to takeover bids." 1969-1970 Ohio Laws 352 (1969) (statute codified at Omo REV.

CODE ANN. §1707.04 (Page 1978)).
53. See Wall St. J., Nov. 19, 1975, at 1, coL 6 (discussing the impact of local industrialists in sponsoring the Ohio and Idaho statutes).
54. See Corporate Takeovers: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, & Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1976) (statement of SEC
Commissioner Loomis); Note, Commerce Clause Limitationsupon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1133 (1974).
55. See infra Part III (discussion of constitutional standards).
56. See, e.g., HAwAI REV. STAT. § 417E-3(f) (Supp. 1976) (imposing a mandatory
sixty-day waiting period before the tender offer became effective).
57. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36-360 (1981).
58. See, e.g., Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH) 97,804,
at 90,031 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980).
59. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-51.5-104(3) (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 301501(5) (e) (1980).
60. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1206, 1224 (D.N.J. 1981).
61. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1061(a) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
62. See, e.g., S.D. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 47-32-3 (1983).
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character of the laws. 63
By the 1980's, state takeover legislation was clearly on a collision course with the Constitution. The seeds of change had been
firmly planted.
I.

CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE: ESTABLISHING THE
ROOM FOR CHANGE

Underlying the preemption and commerce clause challenges to
existing state legislation is the broader issue of whether the states
may regulate the field of corporate takeovers at all. In the face of
other hostile court decisions, Missouri Public Service Co. v. Amen,
in effect, may destroy the theoretical feasibility of any state regulation of tender offers.64 However, an analysis of fundamental constitutional concepts dealing with the commerce clause and
preemption clearly indicates that the law has not foreclosed the
idea of state regulation in toto; some form of state takeover statute,
with the proper legislative posture, may indeed meet with constitutional approval.
On June 23, 1982, the United States Supreme Court finally addressed the controversy surrounding state takeover regulations in
Edgarv. MITE Corp.65 On appeal from the Seventh Circuit,66 the
Court's invalidation of the Illinois Business Takeover Act67 constitutes an integral part in the jigsaw puzzle of state takeover
legislation.
In January of 1979, the MITE Corporation, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Connecticut, made a
tender offer of $28.00 per share for all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet & Machine Company, an Illinois-based and locally held
corporation. The bait in the offer was a premium of $4.00 per share
above market price. 68 MITE complied with the federal disclosure
requirements prescribed in the Williams Act, but filed suit to enjoin Illinois officials from enforcing the state takeover act on the
grounds that it violated the supremacy and commerce clauses of
the federal Constitution.
MITE's constitutional challenges pursuaded the Federal District Court of Illinois to enjoin the Secretary of State from enforc63. For example, in Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
97,804, at 90,032 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980), the court estimated that 99.1 percent of
the publicly held target's shareholders lived beyond the boundaries of the
state which invoked its takeover statute.
64. See infra Section IV(A).
65. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
66. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §§ 137.51-.70 (1980).
68. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 628 (1982).
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ing the takeover act against the bidding corporation. 69 The Illinois
Secretary of State appealed the district court's injunction, but the
Illinois Act again met with defeat at the Seventh Circuit.70 The
Supreme Court heard the Illinois Secretary of State's final appeal,
affirming the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the state takeover
statute.
As one court aptly put it: "Edgaris not exactly a model of judicial unanimity." 71 In the text of the case, there are a total of six
opinions with seven correspondingly splintered viewpoints. Only
six members of the Court addressed the merits of the case, 72 as
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist, dissenting separately,
found the appeal to be moot.7 3 The fragmented breakdown of the
Court may be summarized as follows: with respect to the preemption issue, three members of the Court (led by Justice White) believed that the Illinois Act conflicted with the purposes of the
Williams Act, and was, therefore, operationally preempted under
the supremacy clause; Justice O'Connor did not address this point,
and Justices Powell and Stevens expressed the contrary positionthat the Ilinois law was not federally preempted. Five of the six
Justices addressing the merits of the case further held that, under
the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. standard, the Illinois Business Takeover Act imposed undue burdens on interstate commerce; Justice
Blackmun remained silent on this point.
The White plurality opinion first turned to the issue of preemption. Citing the expression of Congressional intent embodied in
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Justice White reasoned that
"Congress did not explicitly prohibit states from regulating takeovers; it left the determination [of] whether the Illinois statute
conflicts with the Williams Act to the courts." 74 Considering the
MITE Corp. v. Dixon, No. 79 C 200 (N.D. Ill Feb. 9, 1979).
MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1980).
Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 526 (D. Md. 1982).
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Stevens, and
Powell discussed the merits of the case.
73. The dissenting Justices felt that the case was rendered moot by MITE's withdrawal of the tender offer. For a similar interpretation, see Tyco Laboratories, Inc. v. Connelly, 473 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mass. 1979) (challenge to the
constitutionality of the Massachusetts Act rendered moot by the plaintiff's
post-trial disclaimer of interest in making a takeover bid).
74. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982). Not only is there no federal
expression intimating Congress' intent to occupy the field of tender offer regulation, but, to the contrary, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 expressly
reserves room for consistent state securities legislation. Section 28(a) of that
Act states, "[n] othing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the secur69.
70.
71.
72.

ities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any
State over any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the
provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78bb(a) (1976). The Edgar plurality joined even the most hostile cases in
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line of cases which hold that a direct conflict with the federal statute will invalidate the state regulation "where compliance with
75
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,"
the three-man plurality found that it would not be impossible to
Act and the more
comply with both the provisions of the Williams
76
burdensome requirements of the Illinois law.
Having determined that state takeover legislation did not explicitly or directly contradict the Williams Act, Justice White focused his attention on whether the state legislation was
nonetheless preempted because of an operational conflict with the
purposes and objectives of the federal legislation. 77 The plurality
78
found that the basic intent of Congress was to protect investors,
but emphasized that:
[I]t is also crystal clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the
investor was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover bidder
.... Congress sought to protect the investor not only by furnishing him
with the necessary information but also by withholding from management
or the bidder any7 9undue advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an
informed choice.

White then went on to examine three provisions of the Illinois
Act that upset the balance struck by Congress between the bidder,
target management, and target shareholders. One of those provisions was the requirement that the tender offeror notify the Secretary of State and target company of its intent to make a takeover
bid and the material terms thereof twenty days before the offer
becomes effective. 80 White found that this prefiling notice provision not only furnished incumbent management with the powerful

75.
76.

77.

78.
79.
80.

rejecting the notion that the Williams Act expressly preempts state efforts.
See, e.g., National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1129 (8th Cir.
1982); Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182 (1979) (Section 28(a)
"was plainly intended to protect, rather than to limit, state authority.").
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1962)).
The Illinois Act required a precommencement notice to be made 20 business
days before the tender offer became effective, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121-1/2,
§§ 137.54.B, 137.54.E (Supp. 1980), and therefore would be in conflict with Rule
14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1981). See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text. However, the events of this litigation took place prior to the effective date of Rule 14d-2(b), and the Rule operates prospectively only. 44 Fed.
Reg. 70326 (1979).
If the state law frustrates the purposes or policies underlying federal legislation, the head of preemption will rise. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941) (setting forth the preemption test of whether the state law "stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.").
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 633 (1982).
Id. at 633, 634.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §§ 137.54.B, 137.54.E (Supp. 1980).
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tool of delay,8 1 but also found that it acted "to the detriment of
stockholders who will not have an offer before them during this
82

period."

The second troublesome provision in the Illinois Act was the
allowance for an administrative hearing that would suspend the
contemplated transaction. 83 This provision was particularly
skewed toward the target management's ends, as it set no deadline
for the completion of such hearings and required a hearing at the
request of target shareholders.84 White found such unrestrained
potential for derailing legitimate takeover attempts to be contrary
to the philosophy of the Williams Act.85
The plurality finally held that the provision in the Illinois Act
authorizing the Secretary of State to pass judgment on the substantive fairness of the tender offer 86 was preempted. Justice
White reasoned that this authorization interfered with the marketoriented federal goal of an informed decision made by the investor,
87
not by the government.
Several members of the Court emphatically defended the concept of state regulation from the preemption attack. Justice Stevens expressed a strong concern for leaving the door open wide for
state legislation. Stevens was not persuaded that "Congress' decision to follow a policy of neutrality in its own legislation is tantamount to a federal prohibition against state legislation designed to
81.
82.
83.
84.

Edgar v. AMIE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 635 (1982).
Id.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.51.A-.52.B (Supp. 1980).
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 637 (1982) ("Since incumbent management
in many cases will control [large holdings of stock] .. .this provision allows
management to delay the commencement of an offer by insisting on a
hearing.").
85. Courts have long pointed to language in the legislative history of the Williams
Act evincing the goal of neutrality: "We have taken extreme care to avoid
tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of the person
making the takeover bids. S. 510 is designed solely to require full and fair
disclosure for the benefit of investors." 113 CONG. REc. 24664 (1967) (remarks
of Sen. Williams).
86. IL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.57.E (Supp. 1980).
87. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982) ("Both the House and Senate
Reports observed that the [Williams] Act was 'designed to make the relevant
facts known so that shareholders have a fair opportunity to make their decision.'" (Citations omitted.)). Other courts argue that heavy reliance on the
state to-oversee the tender offer process eviscerates the market approach to
investor protection. See, e.g., Hi-Shear Indus., Inc. v. Campbell, FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,804, at 90,031 (D.S.C. Dec. 4, 1980) ('"The benevolent bureaucracy approach is in conflict with the market approach and frustrates the express Congressional intent that the shareholders make their decision.")
(emphasis in original).
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provide special protection for incumbent management." 8 8 Justice
Powell echoed Stevens' concern for leaving room for some form of
state act. 89
In shifting the focus to the commerce clause issue, the enlarged
plurality distinguished state takeover legislation from acceptable
state blue sky laws by stressing that blue sky laws merely regulate
intrastate securities transactions: 9 0 "MITE's offer to Chicago
Rivet's shareholders, including those in Illinois, necessarily employed interstate facilities in communicating its offer, which, if accepted, would result in transactions occurring across state lines." 9 1
The only majority position 92 of the Court emerged in the second
half of Justice White's commerce clause analysis, wherein the
93
opinion applied the heralded Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. test.
Weighing the benefits and burdens in the third prong of the Pike
test, the Court pointed out that the Illinois Act's extraterritorial
nature placed a "substantial" burden on interstate commerce. If
the tender offer attempt was blocked, so argued the Court, shareholders would be deprived of the opportunity to obtain premiums
over the prevailing market price. This lost opportunity would, in
turn, hinder efficient allocation of economic resources and reduce
88. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 655 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and in the judgment).
89. Id. at 646, 647 (Powell, J., concurring in part). Powell explained, "I agree with
Justice Stevens that the Williams Act's neutrality policy does not necessarily
imply a congressional intent to prohibit state legislation designed to assureat least in some circumstances-greater protection to interests that include
but often are broader than those of incumbent management."
90. The underlying purpose of blue sky legislation is local investor protection
from fraud by supplementing the federal securities regulations embodied in
the 1933 and 1934 Acts. See L Loss & E. CowETr, BLUE SKY LAws 17-42 (1958).
In Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557 (1917), the Supreme Court rejected a commerce clause challenge since blue sky laws "apply to dispositions of securities within the State."
91. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982). Only twenty-seven percent of
Chicago Rivet's shareholders resided in Illinois; thus, the tender offer would
by necessity involve a complex network of interstate commerce.
92. Justice White was joined in Section V(B) of his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens and O'Connor.
93. The Supreme Court has employed varying approaches to define the scope of
permissible state regulation under the commerce clause. Compare South
Carolina Highway Dep't. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1938) (state
interest in safety justified the burden on interstate commerce), with Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945) (state interest in safety outweighed by need to maintain federal uniformity).
The Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. decision concentrated the main interacting
forces into a formulation that composes the oft-quoted test: "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest,
and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits." 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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the target management's incentive to perform well.94
The majority seemed to endorse the limited purpose of the Illinois Act in protecting resident security holders by regulating the
internal affairs of companies incorporated within the state. This
"legitimate state objective," however, was outweighed in the Pike
balance by the burden on interstate commerce. The Court further
weighted the balance against the local interest by pointing out the
global application 95 of the Illinois Act to any corporation, located
either within or outside of the state, for which ten percent of the
outstanding shares are held by Illinois residents.9 6
In his separate concurrence, Justice Powell approved of White's
analysis through the Pike balancing standard, because that portion
of the opinion "leaves some room for state regulation of tender
97
offers."

As important as Edgaris in clarifying the field of takeover legislation through its expressed substantive findings, it is more significant for its implications. The true import of the case rests in its
directions for the future. Only three of the Supreme Court Justices found that the particular takeover act was preempted, and
even they did not foreclose the possibility that some type of takeover legislation would pass constitutional muster. Even though a
majority found that the takeover act violated the commerce clause,
the focus of the Court's opinion was on the impact of those provisions peculiar to the Illinois statute. Edgar signaled the demise of
the first wave of state legislation, but left the door open for a sec94. Edgar v. MTE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982). For an in-depth argument in
accord with White's statements to the effect that stifling tender offers ultimately decreases shareholder welfare, see Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
23. But cf.Herzel, Schmidt &Davis, Why CorporateDirectorsHave a Right To
Resist Tender Offers, 3 CoRp.L. REV. 107 (1980).
95. Edgar v. NI=E Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 644 (1982) ("While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state objective, the state has no legitimate interest
in protecting non-resident shareholders.").
96. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, § 137.52-10 (Supp. 1980).
97. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in part).
Powell went on to state:
'This period in our history is marked by conglomerate corporate formations essentially unrestricted by the antitrust laws. Often the offeror possesses resources, in terms of professional personnel
experienced in takeovers as well as of capital, that vastly exceed
those of the takeover target. This disparity in resources may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or regional target corporation.
Inevitably there are certain adverse consequences in terms of general public interest when corporate headquarters are moved away
from a city and State."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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of state efforts to meet with constitutional

IV. POINTING THE WAY FOR CHANGE
A.

Obstruction: Missouri Public Service Co. v. Amen

In light of the foregoing, the decision in Missouri Public Service
Co. v. Amen takes on special significance. It does not involve a
mere run-of-the-mill takeover act meeting its rightful demise;
rather, the federal district court in Missouri Public Service found
itself standing at the crossroads of takeover legislation. The
Supreme Court had just announced its standard for reviewing
state tender offer regulations in Edgar,and the Nebraska Unicameral had responded by constructing what was hoped to be one of
the first constitutionally sound takeover statutes in the United
States, the 1983 Corporate Takeover Act 99 (LB 599). The import of
Missouri Public Service as a test case took a quantum leap, for to
invalidate the new statute is to abandon the idea of state takeover
laws in any form.
On June 13, 1983, Missouri Public Service ("Mopub"), a Missouri power supplier, publicly announced its intention to make a
cash tender offer at $14.00 per share00 for ultimate control of twothirds of the common stock of The Gas Service Co., a natural gas
distributor incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of
business in Missouri.101 As this offer triggered both the Williams
Act and the Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act, Mopub responded
by filing the requisite information with the SEC,102 but failed to
comply with the disclosure provisions of the Nebraska law. Mopub
then brought suit in the Federal District Court of Nebraska seek98. Several commentators have recently reached the same conclusion. See, e.g.,
Note, CorporateBattlesfor Control-Edgarv. MITE and the Constitutionality
of State Takeover Legislation-The Continuing Saga, 26 How. L.J. 1425, 1473
(1983) ('The [Supreme] Court's first substantive foray into the tender offer
thickets leaves considerable room for state regulation of tender offers."). But
cf. Comment, Tender Offers-Edgar v. MITE Corp. and State Tender Offer
Regulation, 9 J. CoRP. L. 95, 112 (1983) ('The [Edgar] decision stands as a
serious, perhaps fatal blow to state regulation of tender offers."); Note, A
Failed Experiment: State Takeover RegulationAfter Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
1983 U. IuL. L.F. 457, 476 ("[O]nly a severely decimated statute can remain
after close constitutional scrutiny.").
99. Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2418, -2430 (Cum.
Supp. 1983).
100. This sum provided a premium of $3.00 per share to the shareholders over the
prevailing market price, representing a total net premium of $9 million. See
Wall St. J., June 13, 1983, at 2, col. 3.
101. Id.
102. Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Amen, No. CV 83-L-362 (D. Neb. June 22, 1983) at 2.
Mopub filed a Schedule 141-1 with the SEC pursuant to §14(d) (1) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(e) (1967).
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ing declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the
state takeover law on the grounds that it violated the supremacy
and commerce clauses of the Constitution.
Two factors in Missouri Public Service indicate that all tender
offer regulations, regardless of their form, are unconstitutional.
First, even though no court has ever held that the federal law possessed such a pervasive and dominant character, 0 3 Mopub contended that the Williams Act represented a "comprehensive...
congressional scheme which regulates the entire field of cash
tender offers. No aspect of this type of securities transaction was
ignored by Congress and no part of it was left to state regulation." 0 4 The plaintiff corporation also relied heavily on two Opinion Letters issued by the office of the Nebraska Attorney General,
predicting that courts would find that the Williams Act "had entirely occupied the field" of tender offer regulation.05 Once again
taking an absolute position, Mopub, in its commerce clause analysis, argued that state regulation of interstate tender offers was, per
10 6
se, an undue burden on interstate commerce.
The second factor indicating a rejection of all types of state
takeover legislation is that the court discarded the entire Nebraska
103. Implicit congressional intent to preempt parallel state law may become manifest if the federal expression is so pervasive that it leaves no room for concurrent state action, Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633
(1978), or if the federal interest so dominates a field that logic mandates exclusion of state laws in the same area. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
Federal tender offer regulation embodied in the Williams Act is a minimum
disclosure statute that does not comprehensively regulate all aspects of the
tender offer. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-4 (1967). The efficacy of
the Act is not tied to exclusive federal jurisdiction.
The federal interest in takeover regulation or in securities regulation as a
whole does not display a preeminence requisite to finding an intent to dominate the field. The interest is not of the same degree, for example, as the
paramount position of the federal government recognized in foreign affairs or
national security, both areas in which the Supreme Court has found concurrent state legislation to be implicitly repugnant. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v.
Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 504-07 (1956). State security laws, however, have long
enjoyed a spirit of cooperation with federal security laws establishing "a second line of protection" for securities investors. SEcuRTIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, SPECIAL STUDY OF SEcunrriEs MAmTS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 734 (1963).
104. Brief for Plaintiff at 5-6, Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Amen, No. CV 83-L-362 (D.
Neb. June 13, 1983).
105. See id. at 9-10 ("While the [Supreme] [C]ourt did not specifically so hold, a
logical extension of the ... [Edgarv. MITE Corp. ] holding might be that the
Williams Act had entirely occupied the field, and that any additional requirements by a state would operate to the advantage of incumbent management,
in violation of the Williams Act. That may be an extreme interpretation, but
it is possible") (quoting Op. No. 88, Neb. Atty. Gen. (April 25, 1983)).
106. See Brief for Plaintiff at 11-16, Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Amen, No. CV 83-L362 (D. Neb. June 22, 1983).
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Act, despite the fact that the most constitutionally objectionable
provisions had been deleted by the actions taken in LB 599.
In May of 1983, the Nebraska Unicameral found itself in a difficult predicament; it was under the heavy lobbying influence of local corporate management to protect resident investors and
company managers from the turmoil of takeover attempts, 0 7 but it
also recognized that its then current legislation had failed constitutional scrutiny upon fifteen or twenty occasions. 108 The legislature
declared a state of emergency 0 9 during which the old Corporate
Takeover Act of 1977110 was replaced with the overhauled version
in LB 599.111
Substantial thought went into this constitutionally streamlined
bill, as Nebraska legislators attempted to avoid all the old mistakes
contained in the former legislation. First, LB 599 added a short expression of legislative intent. The bill declared its purpose to be
that of protecting investors by policing disclosure of information
that would help investors evaluate tender offers."l 2 This explicitly
put the Act in line with the intent of the Williams Act and increased its likelihood of passing preemption analysis." 3
107. Sen. Loran Schmidt, one of the sponsors of LB 599, explained to the State
Department of Banking and Finance that "[t] here are several companies that
have contacted me who are concerned ...
." Nebraska Corporate Takeover
Act: Hearingon LB 599 Before the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance, 87th Leg., 3d Sess., at 86 (Neb. Feb. 22, 1983). At the same hearing,
Martin Colladay, Vice President of Public Affairs from Conagra, Inc. (an
Omaha-based corporation), spoke on behalf of LB 599. Colladay distributed a
pamphlet put out by the Omaha Chamber of Commerce which supported the
legislation. See id. at 88.
108. Id. at 90 (remarks of Barry Lake, former legal counsel for the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance: "Within the last five years our department
has probably been sued about 15 or 20 times" by takeover bidders enjoining
enforcement of the 1977 Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act.).
109. See Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act § 16, 1983 Neb. Laws 1334, 1339.
110. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2401 to -2417 (1977) (repealed 1983).
111. The 1977 Act was repealed in The Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act § 15, 1983
Neb. Laws 1334, 1339.
112. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2419 (Cum. Supp. 1983) ('The purpose of this act is to
provide protection to offerees by requiring that an offeror make full, fair, and
effective disclosure of all material facts necessary for the making of an informed decision about a takeover bid.").
113. Compare KY. REV. STAT. § 292.560-.630 (Baldwin 1981), where the Kentucky
Legislature unabashedly stated the purpose of its tender offer regulation as
"[a] n Act relating to the prevention of take-over bids through the purchase of
corporate securities." 1976 Ky. Acts 534 (statute codified at KY. REV. STAT.
§ 292.560-.630 (Baldwin 1981)).
It should be noted that the old Nebraska statute was silent as to legislative
intent. However, portions of the legislative history indicate a slight recurring
undercurrent of protectionism in the motives behind the 1983 Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act. See Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act: Hearingon LB
599 Before the Nebraska Departmentof Banking and Finance at 88 (February
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LB 599 also redefined the term "takeover bid" in radically different terms by deleting the friendly offer exemption" 4 of the 1977
version." 5 Courts have rightly charged that the mere stamp of
management's approval does not aid the shareholders in making a
more intelligent investment decision." 6 A "friendly" tender offer
only transfers the decision from the hands of investors into the
hands of a paternalistic management, thus frustrating the federal
objective of protecting investors while preserving the forces of the
market environment." 7 Not only does the elimination of the
friendly offer exemption help the Nebraska Act withstand the preemption analysis, but it also settles some commerce clause concerns. The exemption saturated the 1977 Act with a protectionist
hue, making the legislation resemble an attempt to inhibit hostile
takeovers, rather than an attempt to evenhandedly regulate.
The most important change in the new regulations was the
wholesale withdrawal of any form of built-in statutory delay. In
the 1977 law, a precommencement waiting period of twenty days
after public announcement was mandatory before any bid would
be recognized as effective." 8 In 1980, the SEC promulgated Rule
14d-2(b),119 which juxtaposed the federal and state provisions so
as to put them in direct conflict; 12 0 under the federal regulations,
the tender offer's validity is triggered immediately upon announcement, while state statutes contained similar delay provisions as
were contained in the old Nebraska Act.121 Thus Rule 14d-2 (b) set
state takeover legislation on a collision course with the federal reg-

114.
115.
116.
117.

118.
119.
120.

121.

22, 1983) (Martin Colladay remarked: '"This makes Nebraska a more attractive locale for new businesses and decreases the possibility of relocation
and/or liquidation of successful Nebraska businesses.").
Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2420(1) (Cum. Supp.
1983), deletes the exemption from its definition of a "takeover bid."
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2401 (1977) (repealed 1983).
See, e.g., Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278 (5th Cir. 1978)
(referring to IDAHO CODE § 30-1501(5)(e) (1980 & Supp. 1980)).
One commentator contended "it may be more important to shareholders of a
target company that full and fair disclosure be made in the case of a 'friendly'
tender offer than in the case of an 'unfriendly' offer because in the former
situation, deals may have been struck between management and the offeror
of which the shareholders are unaware." Tiger, supra note 8, at 471 n.96.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2402 (1977) (repealed 1983).
SEC Exchange Act Rel. No. 16384, 1979-1980 FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH) 1 82,373.
The SEC explained its action as follows:
While recognizing its long and beneficial partnership with the
states in the regulation of securities transactions, the Commission
nevertheless believes that the state takeover statutes presently in effect [emphasis supplied] frustrate the operation and purposes of the
Williams Act and that ... Rule 14d-2(b) is necessary for the protection of investors and to achieve the purposes of the Williams Act.
Id. at 82,584.
For examples of precommencement waiting period provisions, see DEL CODE
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ulations, ultimately leaving a dramatic imprint upon subsequent
case law. 22 LB 599 eliminates the potential for delay by recognizing offers as being effective upon the filing of certain disclosures
"as soon as practicable on the day of the first public announcement
of the takeover bid."123
Mopub further argued that the disclosure provisions of the Nebraska Act of 1983 are more extensive than those found in the Williams ActZ24 and, therefore, urged that "'in the area of financial
disclosure it can be true that "less is more." Disclosure of a mass
of irrelevant data can confuse the investor and obscure relevant
disclosure.' "125 The more rigorous disclosure provisions have also
been charged with tipping the legislative scales toward incumbent
management by facilitating the obstruction of bids with defective
12
flings.

6

On the other hand, various courts have correctly defended additional state disclosure requirements as being consistent with, and
supplemental to, the informative disclosure provisions of the Williams Act.127 Nebraska defused the dilemma by letting the bidder
off the hook with relatively minor disclosure hardships.28 These
disclosure requirements are similar to the anti-fraud segment of
the act, 29 as they supplement the goal of the federal Williams Act
to protect investors. Similar provisions in other challenged statutes have rarely been attacked by any court. Even those jurisdictions invalidating the local takeover act have been careful to save
the anti-fraud provisions.30

122.

123.
124.
125.
126.

127.
128.
129.
130.

ANN. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.570(1) (Baldwin Cum. Supp. 1980).
Nearly all courts have recognized the irreconcilable conflict between Rule
14d-2(b) and state precommencement waiting periods. See, e.g., Natomas Co.
v. Bryan, 512 F. Supp. 191, 193 (D. Nev. 1981); Eure v. Grand Metropolitan Ltd.,
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,694, at 98,648 (N.C. Super. Ct. 1980).
Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act, NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2421 (Cum. Supp.
1983).
Mopub isolated the more extensive provisions. See Brief for Plaintiff at Appendix A, Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Amen, No. CV 83-L-362 (D. Neb. June 22,
1983).
Id. at 14-15 (quoting Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1280 (5th
Cir. 1978)).
See Brudney, A Note on Chilling Tender Soliciations,21 RUTGERS L REv. 609,
624 (1967) ("Te very process of providing additional information operatesand is intended to operate-to increase the cost and to diminish the chances
of success of the outside bidders ... .
See, e.g., Strode v. Esmark, Inc., FED. SEC. L REP. (CCH)
97,538, at 97,807
(May 13, 1980).
Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2423 (Cum. Supp.
1983).
Id.; NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2424 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
See, e.g., Kennecott v. Smith, 507 F. Supp. 1207, 1225 (D. N.J. 1981) ('"The only
sections which may survive after removing the [takeover] act's vital organs
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Moreover, in an attempt to balance the policing effort, the 1983
act has instituted a novel idea of symmetrical regulation. Section
21-2425 of the Nebraska Takeover Act requires the target corporation's management to ifie copies of its own pieces of propaganda
sent to shareholders.'13 The anti-fraud provision in section 21-2424
also applies equally to the target's management as well as the offeror. These provisions should quiet some of the criticism concerning inhibition of takeover attempts, as they may actually tend
to aid bidders.
The whole complexion of the 1983 administrative enforcement
provisions differs substantially from the 1977 version. The old
scheme afforded the State Department of Banking and Finance almost absolute authority in pulling the strings of a takeover bid, especially with regard to plenary powers to delay.132 The
Department possessed the power to "summarily delay the effective date of the offer" if it deemed the filing of information insufficient. 133 With such a provision, it is no wonder that the tender
offer became known as the tender trap.134 Delay was a built-in feature of the old statute, as a hearing automatically suspended the
offer into a state of limbo until the Department gave its stamp of
35
approval.
The 1983 regulatory scheme has reduced the spectre of administrative intervention in the takeover bid process so as to achieve an
equilibrium which still provides investors with a forum for relief,
while muting the blatantly delay-oriented provisions of the old act.
The legislation authorizes the State Department of Banking and
Finance to conduct an investigation "as it deems necessary" concerning the offeror's compliance with the statute's disclosure requirements.136 In addition to these investigatory powers, the
Department may exercise authority to enjoin offers to or

131.

132.
133.
134.
135.

136.

are the anti-fraud provisions... ...
"); Kelly v. Beta-X Corp., 103 Mich. App. 51,
59, 302 N.W.2d 596, 599-600 (1981).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2425 (Cum. Supp. 1983) requires that "[n] o solicitation
or recommendation to the stockholders of a target company to accept or reject a takeover bid shall be made unless.. . the person making such solicitation or recommendation has filed copies ... with the department [of
Banking and Finance]."
See NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2402 (Supp. 1979) (repealed in 1983).
Id.
See Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their
Constitutionality,45 FORDHAm L. REV. 1 (1976).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2406 (1977) (repealed in 1983) ("If it [the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance] finds that the takeover bid provides for
full and fair disclosure to offerees of all material information concerning the
offer, it shall by order declare the offer effective.").
Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act, NEB.REv. STAT. § 21-2428(1) (Cure. Supp.
1983).
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purchases from Nebraska residents "in the event that any person
is violating or about to violate any provision of this act."' 3 7 The
1983 statute thus authorizes administrative involvement only to
the extent needed to police compliance, and avoids giving the state
carte blanche to summarily block the tender offer.
When determining the scope of administrative review, most
courts exhibit two competing biases: on the one hand, courts suspect the worst in target management's motives for resisting takeover bids138 on the other hand, these same courts cling to a faith in
pure market forces. 139 The extreme distrust of the legislative efforts to regulate takeovers in a controlled market approach is unwarranted. Dissatisfied with the rigidity of the market approach,
the SEC has assimilated some of the fiduciary oriented tenets of
state legislation into the Williams Act.140 The conceptual underpinnings of the market approach do not go far to shelter investors
from the turbulence of the real market, as aggressive and sophisticated practices of arbitrageurs, and the complex dangers of a large
securities transaction, could conspire to dupe the most informed
analysts of Wall Street. 14 1 The suspicion of incumbent management's motives is also overplayed, as the members of management
are bound by the traditional fiduciary duties of corporate managers' 42 and the threat of suit from disgruntled shareholders. 14 3
137. Id. at § 21-2428(2). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-3-8(b) (Burns Supp. 1976)
(Indiana injunction provision).
138. This cynicism may not be totally without reason. See Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168 (N.D. Ill.
1980) (shareholder's suit against target
management for defeating a tender offer with a premium exceeding 100 percent of the price). See also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23.
139. For example, the court in Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 188 (3d Cir.
1980), placed its faith in the free flow of information provided in the "unfettered" market setting.
140. The SEC has even advocated independent board review of takeovers to determine whether they are appropriate or not. ConglomerateMergers-The Effects on Small Businesses and Local Communities: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Restraint of Trade Activities Affecting Small
Business of the House Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 255, 28788 (1980) (testimony of Harold M. Williams, Chairman, SEC). Also, the new
Schedule 14D-1 (adopted in 1977) required more detailed disclosures than in
previous filings.
141. With the increasing sums of money involved and the emergence of sophisticated and active arbitrage forces working with offerors in these complex
transactions, the pure market approach may have some shortcomings. See
Comment, Should Tender Offer Arbitrage Be Regulated?, 1978 DuKE LJ.1000
(1978).
142. See generally Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U.L. REV. 403 (1980); Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L.
REV. 901 (1979); Note, Tender Offer Defensive Tactics and the Business Judgment Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621 (1983).
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This does not mean, however, that states may place shackles on
the market to attain any goal that advances the interests of the
investor. The state should intervene only to make up for some of
the limitations inherent in the market approach so as not to tip the
scale of neutrality in either direction. Section 21-2428 of the Nebraska Act appears to have done a masterful job in balancing these
interests. It provides a mechanism for reviewing compliance with
disclosure requirements, without adjudicating the substantive fairness of the tender offer itself.144 The procedural safeguards in the
injunction procedure,145 coupled with the advantage of providing
investors with a remedy before the tender offer is completed, complement the market approach to investor protection.
The alterations effected in the 1983 Act also erased the portions
of the old statute which were objectionable to the commerce
clause. Very little connection between the regulating state and the
target corporation was required to trigger the application of the
1977 tender offer regulations. The only prerequisite to application
was that the target company be a corporation "whose securities
are to be the subject of a takeover bid."146 The looseness of this
nexus between the corporation and the state has been attacked
elsewhere as not supporting a legitimate local interest sufficient to
satisfy the Pike test.147
Those courts which have attacked tender offer regulations' constitutionality under the commerce clause have rightly indicated
that a local interest is served only if the state regulates the internal
workings of a local corporation, or if it is protecting local shareholders. Stated conversely, a state has no legitimate local interest
in regulating the affairs of foreign corporations or protecting nonresident shareholders. 148 Most states have attempted to tighten
143. Target management has an affirmative duty to oppose a tender offer it believes is contrary to the corporation's best interests. See Lewis v. McGraw,
619 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 951 (1980); Berman v. Gerber
Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). See also Block & Miller, supra
note 23, at 66-67; Upton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.
LAw. 101 (1979).
144. Compare Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2428 (Cum.
Supp. 1983) (administrative review), with NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2406 (1977)
(repealed in 1983).
145. See Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1033 (1st Cir. 1982)
('"The traditional equitable prerequisites to injunctive relief are required.
Thus, injunctions may not be granted simply by showing a violation of the
Act: there must also be irreparable harm, and the injunction must be tailored
to fit the circumstances of the particular case.").
146. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2401(4) (1977) (repealed 1983).
147. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. Lam, 509 F. Supp. 782, 789 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ('"The Court
agrees that the protection of investors is a legitimate state interest, but only
to the extent those investors reside in Pennsylvania.").
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the nexus between the state and the target corporation by enacting
additional requirements that the company be chartered under the
state's laws' 49 or, alternatively, that the state's laws regulate only
corporations with some established business presence within the
state. 15 0 These measures insure the local character of the statutory interest.
Nebraska has attempted to neutralize commerce clause criticism in a twofold approach. First, the legislature has redefined the
term "target corporation" to include only those companies whose
equity securities are subject to the contemplated bidding and
which have thirty-five or more shareholders in Nebraska.151 Although the bill's sponsors acknowledged that there was nothing
"magic" about the number thirty-five, 152 the provision did demonstrate a minimum level of local interest that the statute must
serve.
The thirty-five shareholder requirement did not, however, shed
the extraterritorial implications of the statute. In an effort to erradicate the extraterritoriality problem, Nebraska adopted a novel
provision which restricts the authority to block offers under the
Act to those instances involving resident shareholders. The statute clearly states that "any injunction issued under sections 212418 to 21-2430 [the Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act] may only
enjoin offers to or purchases from Nebraska residents pursuant to
a takeover bid."53 Thus the state legislature sidestepped the debate as to whether tender offer legislation should be characterized
as securities regulation, or as state corporation law, and placed this
statute in the vein of blue sky securities law. Although the potential for application to interstate transactions does yet exist, LB 599
requires protection only of resident investors. Thus LB 599 fits
well within the ambit of the constitutionally accepted blue sky
laws.15
149. See, e.g., MD.CoRPs. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN.§ 11-902(n) (2) (iv), (i) (1-2) (Supp.
1980). As amended by 1981 Md. Laws ch. 776, the target corporation must be
organized in Maryland, be doing business in the state, and have at least
thirty-five shareholders in the state.
150. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-2-3.1-1(j) (Burns Supp. 1981) (as amended by
Pub. L. No. 215 (1981)).
151. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2420 (Cum. Supp. 1983).
152. Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act: Hearing on LB 599 Before the Nebraska
Department of Banking and Finance, 87th Leg., 3d Sess., at 88 (Neb. Feb. 22,
1983) (remarks of Senator Newell and Martin Colladay).
153. NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2428(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
154. A notable issue in determining the overall legitimacy of interests served in
state takeover statutes is whether such statutes protect investors as a form of
state securities regulation, or as a traditional form of state corporate law. If
state takeover legislation is a form of securities regulation, it may fail the test
for constitutionality applied to other state securities regulations, namely blue
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Toward Constitutional Acceptability

It is instructive to look at how several recent cases have analyzed state takeover laws which have been reshaped with an eye
toward gaining constitutional acceptance. Some of these cases
have distilled and separated out the component provisions of the
acts in an effort to adapt to the jurisprudential evolution unfolding
in tender offer legislation. For example, in Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc. v. Marley, 55 the Oklahoma District Court granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the Oklahoma takeover
statute.156 In doing so, the court noted the surgical changes that
the Oklahoma legislature had made on the statute "in an effort to
57
'harmonize' the Oklahoma Act with provisions of federal law.'
In this "harmonizing" effort, a pre-filing notification requirement
was eliminated in order to make compliance with the new Rule
14d-2(b) possible.158 Even so, the court found that another provision conflicted with the supremacy and commerce clauses.15 9 The
significance of the case lies in the court's willingness to break
law
down its examination of the statute and to look at the takeover
0
in question as something more than a monolithic entity.16
sky laws. Since the original commerce clause challenge of blue sky laws in
1917, state securities regulations have been upheld on the narrow precept
that they protected resident investors, and thus did not have the extraterritorial quality inherent in most takeover statutes. See Caldwell v. Sioux Falls
Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539
(1917); Merrick v. N.W. Italsey &Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
If, however, takeover legislation is categorized in the traditional mold of
state corporate regulation, the application of full faith and credit from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, combined with the states' strong and historic interest
in regulating upheavals in the inner corporate structure, may act to carry the
legislation to the satisfaction of legitimacy requirements. See Kaplan, For-

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

eign Corporationsand Local Corporate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433 (1968),
for an in-depth look at the state's right to regulate extraterritorial events that
have impact on local corporate activity.
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,246 (W.D. Okla. July 17, 1981).
Oklahoma Multinational Corporation Take-Over Bid Act, 71 OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 71 §§ 414-421 (Supp. 1980).
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marley, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,246, at
91,618 (N.D. Okla. July 17, 1981).
Id. at 91,618-19.
The court still found an administrative hearing provision to be repugnant to
the purposes of the Williams Act, id. at 91,619.
Other recent cases have compared the statute under scrutiny to the Illinois
act struck down in Edgarv. MITE Corp. See National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC
Corp., 687 F.2d 1122, 1128 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Our examination reveals that there
are no significant distinctions between the Illinois and Missouri Takeover
Acts; therefore, the issues ... are controlled by the majority decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp."); Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co., FED. SEC. L.
Illinois Act and
REP. (CCH) 99,064, at 95,048 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 21, 1982) ('"e
the Oklahoma Act are not materially different.").
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Also, in Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 161 the Federal
District Court in Maryland granted a preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the Maryland Corporate Take-Over
Law.162 The court took this action even though it noted that the
statute was amended in 1980 to give the Maryland Securities Commissioner the power to exempt transactions from particular provisions of the takeover act "to the extent the Commissioner deems
such action necessary or appropriate to make their applications
reasonably consistent" with federal legislation.163 The court found
that the Commissioner's relaxation of the act's disclosure requirements, while leaving unaltered the pre-filing notification provision,
64
was not sufficient to make the statute constitutionally sound.1
The clearest indication of judicial acquiescence to the legislative changes taking place in corporate takeover regulations ap5
peared in Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly.16
In this recent
case, Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Agency)
challenged the State's power to block Agency's tender offer for a
controlling number of shares in Spencer Companies. The state of
Massachusetts invoked its takeover statute after Agency failed to
disclose, contemporaneously with its offer announcement, its intent to gain control. On appeal, the First Circuit became the first
court to affirm the legitimacy of a state takeover act since the Edgar decision.
The Massachusetts Act has been pruned down to a basic antifraud/disclosure statute that appears to be perfectly compatible
with the Williams Act.166 Recognizing this compatibility between
the state and federal statutes, the First Circuit dismissed the
charges of preemption. The court discussed Supreme Court cases
and the underlying purposes of the Williams Act in an attempt to
dispel the possibility of operational preemption, and concluded:
"While the importance of neutrality-neither encouraging nor discouraging tender offers, by not favoring either the target's management or the bidder-was recognized, this was viewed by the
[Supreme] Court essentially only as a means to the end of investor protection."167 Focusing on Powell's and Stevens' concur161. 547 F. Supp. 522 (D. Md. 1982).
162. MD.CoRps. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.§§ 11-901 to -11-908 (Supp. 1980).

163. Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 524 (1982) (quoting
MD.CoRps. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 11-902(d) (Supp. 1980)).

164. Bendix Corp. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 547 F. Supp. 522, 532 (1982).
165. 686 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
166. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 110C (West Supp. 1981) (amended by 1981
Mass. Acts ch. 508). This Act contains no precommencement waiting period
or prefihing notification and contains an unrestrictive hearing procedure.
167. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1033 (1st Cir. 1982). The
First Circuit was discussing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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rences in Edgar, the First Circuit insisted that the policy of
neutrality evinced by Congress in the Williams Act did not amount
to a prohibition against68affording at least some protection for incumbent management.1
The core importance in Agency Rent-A-Car emerged in the
First Circuit's following words:
It is vital at the outset to distinguish this case from others involving tender
offer regulation preemption issues. In Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Court
held that the Illinois take-over statute was unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause. Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, expressed his view that the state statute was also preempted by the Williams Act. Even were this the view of a majority of the
Court, it would not require that the Massachusetts law be struck down.
The provisions of the Illinois act that Justice White focused on all
presented far169more egregious conflicts with the Williams Act than is apparent here.

The Agency Rent-A-Car court thus displayed a needed flexibility
in evaluating a particular takeover statute on its individual merits,
rather than rigidly branding the law as unconstitutional without
further thought. The First Circuit recognized that differences do
exist between various state takeover laws; moreover, the court
heeded these differences as warranting different constitutional
treatment.
Agency further challenged the provision in the Massachusetts
Act imposing automatic delays for violations of the concededly
valid disclosure provisions. Agency argued that this provision was
preempted because it went further than was necessary to protect
investors, thereby tipping the scales too far in favor of target management.170 In a lucid preemption analysis, the First Circuit laced
a long line of cases together to demonstrate that Congress had not
expressed an intent to occupy the entire field of tender offer reguIn that case, an unsuccessful takeover bidder (Chris-Craft) brought suit
under the Williams Act for damages resulting from alleged fraudulent actions
taken by the management of the target company in resisting the takeover
attempt. The tender offeror contended that Congress, by navigating a new
course of neutrality, had in fact attempted to steer away from defensive maneuvers that aided management of the target corporation in impeding the
takeover attempt. The Supreme Court discarded this contention, as Chief
Justice Burger responded emphatically that "[t]he legislative history ...
shows that Congress was intent upon regulating takeover bidders, theretofore operating covertly, in order to protect the shareholders of target companies ....

."

Id. at 29. Burger went on to say that "Congress was indeed

committed to a policy of neutrality in contests for control, but its policy of
evenhandedness does not go... to the purpose of the legislation... Neutrality is, rather, but one characteristic of legislation directed toward a different purpose-the protection of investors." Id.
168. Id. at 1034.
169. Id. at 1035-36.
170. Id. at 1036.
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lation. Even though the court acknowledged that the Massachusetts law did allow the state to delay the tender offer in the event of
a violation of the statute, such delay was not found to be inimical
to the purposes of the federal Williams Act. The court agilely
dodged the preemption problem in the statute's provision for delay
by distinguishing between delays emanating from sanctions, and
delays automatically resulting from compliance with state take17 1
over laws.
The First Circuit finally remanded the case to the district court
level in order to apply the factual background to the more problematic commerce clause issue. 172 The court was careful to note
that " [w] hile Edgar indicates that the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute presents very serious and substantial questions, . . . [the benefits and burdens of the statute] are not
necessarily identical to the benefits and burdens of the Illinois
statute at issue in Edgar."173
V.

CONCLUSION

The Nebraska Corporate Takeover Act was carefully rebuilt to
meet the constitutional standards etched out in Edgar v. MITE
Corp. When confronted with such an innovative legislative effort,
the courts must resist the reflex to invalidate the law without taking into account its new structure. Holding that the Williams Act
occupies the entire field of tender offer regulation, and that no path
of reconciliation with the spirit of the commerce clause may be
forged, should be recognized as an aberration from the standing
law. This should be remedied as soon as possible. Adherence to
the Missouri Public Service rationale could spell the demise for
worthy state regulation; whereas, following a more flexible approach leaves room for takeover legislation to continue its evolution toward constitutional acceptability.
Daniel FreemanKaplan '84

171. Id. at 1037-39. "[T]he disclosure requirements. . . and the deterrent effect of
...
[the] one-year ban [on further bids, imposed as a penalty for violating
the disclosure requirements,] operate in general toward the same end as the
federal statute: protection of investors ....
" Id. at 1039.
172. The Massachusetts Act contained no provision similar to that of NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2428(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983). See supra note 153 and accompanying
text.
173. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Connolly, 686 F.2d 1029, 1040 (1st Cir. 1982).

